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Debate 
 
Rough Time in Paradise: Claims, Blames and  
Memory Making Around Some Protected  
Areas in Kenya 
 
Lotte Hughes 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
IN A RECENT ISSUE of Conservation and Society, Rangarajan and Shahabuddin 
(2006) provide a biological and historical synthesis of issues relating to the 
displacement and relocation of people from protected areas. Rather than re-
spond directly to the original article, this contribution is inspired by it and ex-
plores related issues from an East African perspective1. I will draw upon my 
experience as an Africanist historian who has investigated colonial-era land 
alienation in the former protectorate of British East Africa (BEA, now 
Kenya)2. With editorial permission, I will personalise part of this article by 
describing an exchange of views with a conservation biologist and others on 
my 2006 book. The case study I examined through oral testimony and archival 
research—major land losses and forced removals of Maasai communities by 
British administrators in the 1900s—provides an instructive African example 
of ‘older antecedents of widespread dislocation of resident peoples’ (Rangara-
jan & Shahabuddin 2006: 359), though not in this instance from areas re-
served for parks—they came later3. As a former settler colony, this is a very 
different scenario from India, but there are also many parallels. European set-
tler imaginings of landscape and wilderness as pristine and uninhabited—
which continue to powerfully influence local, regional and international con-
servationist practice and discourses—bring a different element to the discus- 
 
 
 
Lotte Hughes, The Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts, The Open 
University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK. 
 
Address for Correspondence 
Lotte Hughes, The Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts, The Open 
University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK. 
E-mail: l.hughes@open.ac.uk 
Conservation and Society, Pages 307–330 
Volume 5, No. 3, 2007 
Copyright: © Lotte Hughes 2007. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use and distribution of the article, 
provided the original work is cited. 
/ Lotte Hughes 308 
sion (see Bunn 2007 for analysis of a South African example). Equally, Afri-
can imaginings of the past, and of lost lands, should be factored into the 
analysis and subjected to scrutiny.  
 What is thus far missing from the debate, I suggest, is a discussion of social 
memory and its applications, particularly in the context of land restitution 
wrangles and contestation over natural resources. There also needs to be 
deeper historical analysis over the longer term; despite their title, the authors 
have tended to focus more on social science scholarship than history. The sub-
heading ‘A touch of history’ (op cit 367) is rather a giveaway; with respect, 
more than a touch is required4.  
 To summarise, firstly, the historical relocation I will describe was an evic-
tion, but it was not for conservation. Expulsion of indigenous communities for 
conservation purposes came much later, from areas set aside for national 
parks or reserves [e.g. Nairobi National Park, gazetted 1946; Amboseli, 
Chyulu Hills and Tsavo (1948). Amboseli and Chyulu Hills were later up-
graded from reserves to parks]5. Maasai retained some access rights to re-
serves, so these dates do not mark when they were evicted. Amboseli, for 
instance, became a national park in 1974 and was vacated 3 years later; they 
allegedly did so willingly in return for benefits (Lindsay 1987: 156–158; 
Western 1994: 35). Also, despite some political leaders’ rhetoric, and that of 
certain polemical writers, Maasai people were not the only African residents 
and resource users of areas that became protected; for instance, Kamba and 
Waliangulu (Waata) hunters were barred from Tsavo after gazettement6. 
David Western, former director of the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), has 
written extensively about Amboseli from a scientific viewpoint, drawing on 
40 years’ experience and rich empirical evidence, but to my knowledge no de-
tailed studies have specifically examined human displacement from this or 
any other protected area in Kenya7. There is no Kenyan equivalent of Brock-
ington’s Mkomazi research (2002), and this is urgently needed—not least be-
cause Mkomazi has come to ‘stand for’ a regional model, in the absence of 
other studies. He and Igoe have rightly called for more, detailed case studies8. 
I cannot provide one here, supported by adequate data, but I will discuss the 
case of the Masai Mara Game Reserve to illustrate what happens when ‘mem-
ory’ (and its uses in political agitation) becomes confused with ‘history’9. 
There was apparently little or no forced eviction from Mara in order to create 
a reserve, but because this and other protected areas were carved out of lands 
formerly used by Maasai (albeit shared with other groups), these losses have 
been elided in the collective memory. Hence some Maasai conjoin all their 
land and resource losses when calling for redress for both contemporary and 
historical injustices, and imply that forced displacement happened in all in-
stances10. While wholly understandable from a human rights perspective, this 
can obscure the historical facts in specific cases.  
 Secondly, following on from the last point, there is a vital need when exam-
ining displacement and land alienation to factor in memory making, and con-
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structions and deconstructions of the past, memory, ethnicity and cultural 
identity. These processes and products of social memory are inextricably 
linked to contemporary political consciousness and the discourses, which flow 
around reparations claims, locally and globally, and should not be omitted 
from accounts of past or present-day displacement from protected areas. In 
African studies, they feature most prominently in the southern African litera-
ture (e.g. Alexander et al. 2000; Brooks 2000; Bohlin 2007; James 2007 to 
some extent; Jannecke 2006 and other papers presented at a conference on 
land restitution in South Africa (see references); Ranger 1999; Walker 2000; 
McGregor 2003; Stolten 2007). Many of these link to the historiography of 
post-conflict social healing and reconciliation, which employs similar theo-
retical tools. Igoe has produced rich and stimulating work on constructions of 
indigeneity in Tanzania (2004, 2006), yet does not discuss the role of social 
memory in these processes. His focus, and that of Hodgson (2004), has been 
more on the evolution of indigenous social movements. Rangarajan and Sha-
habuddin (2006) fail to mention the word memory (apart from a passing refer-
ence to Schama 1995, Landscape and Memory). Brockington and Igoe use the 
same citation, when making the catch-all claim that ‘protestors fight their 
symbolic obliteration from the landscape—their removal from its history, 
memory and representation’ (2006: 425). Brockington mentions constructions 
of ethnic identity (e.g. 2002: 37), ‘wildness’ as a European cultural construct 
(2002: 47), and different groups’ constructions of ‘images of the environment 
and environmental change that work for them’ (2002:81), but not memory it-
self as a construction11. While raising important issues, he tends to emphasise 
European constructions of nature and their inherent dangers, paying less atten-
tion to African ones—though he suggests the possibility of ‘rose-tinted views’ 
(2002: 81, 87). Thirdly, I will query whether forced eviction is commonly a 
feature of displacement for parks; this is implied by Rangarajan and Sha-
habuddin (e.g. 2006: 359, 361, 369) and others12. In my study area, although 
some Maasai now claim that communities were forced out of the Mara in or-
der to make way for a game reserve, the fact is that this area was relatively 
unpopulated anyway (largely because of tsetse fly), and their own leaders re-
linquished it for conservation in 1961 (Mol 1980: 49)13. This appears to have 
been ‘forgotten’. 
 To briefly answer Brockington and Igoe (2006), in no way have Maasai 
been obliterated from this landscape and promotion of it worldwide. Masai 
Mara is synonymous with Maasai people and culture, a fact which every 
Maasai living around the reserve capitalises on, if it is within their means to 
do so. (This learned behaviour vis-à-vis tourists bears out Igoe’s earlier ob-
servations that ‘the prominence of Maasai ethnicity in the European imagina-
tion is a symbolic currency that Maasai have deployed to their advantage at 
various points in history’, and the enormous ‘marketability of Maasainess’ 
which NGOs exploit, 2004: 13, 16.)14 The forms this can take range from in-
dividuals demanding payment for tourist photographs, women selling ‘tradi-
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tional’ beadwork at the roadside or in cultural manyatas15, wildlife associa-
tions in the dispersal area around Mara taking a percentage of tourists’ game 
viewing fees (currently 40 US dollars a day per person), young men hiring 
themselves out as exotic dancers, cultural experts and guides at lodges and 
camps, to elite families (such as the Ntutus, the biggest land owners in the 
area) gaining wealth from rents received from luxury lodges built on their 
land16. Tourism revenues are not equitably shared, however, and women in 
particular do not get their fair share of the spoils. I do not wish to imply (a) 
that all Maasai and other communities living around parks benefit sufficiently 
from them; or (b) that there are no associated problems, such as hu-
man-wildlife conflict in the wildlife dispersal areas17. But, apart from the sea-
sonal need to access important resources such as swamps in certain parks, 
notably Amboseli, it could be argued that dispersal areas are more important 
to local people than the actual parks, some of which are very small18.  
 The repercussions of the displacement I studied, and concomitant loss of 
resources, have been considerable in socio-economic, political, cultural and 
environmental terms; the ripple effects can be traced to the present day. They 
have been a factor in fatal clashes over access to land and natural resources 
which continue to rock Kenya (together with contestations in other parts of 
the country, such as the Mau Forests of south-western Kenya and around 
Mount Elgon in the western highlands)19. At the time, in 1913, a small group 
of Maasai mounted an unsuccessful legal challenge to the land grab, with the 
help of locally based British lawyers and sympathisers. In 2004, there were 
renewed demands for reparations, which brought the story full circle nearly 
100 years later (Maasai Memorandum 2004; Kantai 2005). Claims for the re-
turn of land and compensation for injustices, which would entail revisiting the 
1913 case, have yet to be heard in a court of law (Hughes 2005).  
 
THE COLONIAL-ERA DISPLACEMENT 
 
To summarise the historical events in this case, in 1904-1905 the British 
forcibly moved certain sections of this pastoralist community from its favour-
ite grazing grounds in the central Rift Valley (the lush corridor between Na-
ivasha and Nakuru) into two reserves in order to make way for white 
settlement20. One reserve was on Laikipia in the northern highlands, the other 
in the south on the border with German East Africa (later Tanganyika and 
Tanzania) where other Maasai sections already resided. Under a 1904 Maasai 
Agreement or treaty, the Maasai were told they could keep these reserved ar-
eas for ‘so long as the Masai as a race shall exist’. After 7 years, the British 
broke their promise and moved the ‘northern’ Maasai again, at gunpoint, from 
Laikipia to an extended Southern Maasai Reserve. Upwards of 20,000 people 
and at least 2.5 million livestock were moved between 1911 and 191321. 
White settlement of the highlands was the primary reason for the second ex-
pulsion, too. Other motivations included a desire to concentrate the Maasai in 
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one reserve in order to facilitate the administration and taxation of nomadic 
people who were often officially regarded as wayward and deviant, and whose 
livestock was believed to pose a disease threat to imported settler stock. 
 The second move was sanctioned by a 1911 Agreement, which Maasai later 
claimed their leaders signed under heavy duress. (Today, Maasai refer to it in 
inverted commas as an ‘Agreement’ to indicate the coercion which led to 
Maasai representatives putting their thumbprints to it.) This effectively ren-
dered the first Agreement void. As a result of these two moves, and others I 
will not go into, the Maasai of BEA lost at least 50 per cent of the land they 
had once utilised. It may have been as much as 70 per cent; it is difficult to ar-
rive at an exact figure since land in Maasai use, as opposed to occupation, be-
fore 1904 was never surveyed and quantified22. Maasai activists have not 
stipulated total acreage or square kilometres in their current reparations de-
mands, nor specified what exact territory was lost, which suggests the com-
munity is also unable to retrospectively quantify its losses23. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE MOVES24 
 
It is widely accepted, despite the above remarks about inexact figures, that the 
Maasai’s quantitative land losses to the British were considerable. More of 
their land was probably alienated than that of any other community in Kenya, 
though every ethnic group experienced losses of one sort or another. But their 
qualitative losses, in terms of the richness of their former northern habitat, the 
comparative inferiority of the Southern Reserve, and the migrants’ vulnerabil-
ity to disease there, were largely unknown before I attempted to document 
them, from oral and archival sources, in my doctoral dissertation and book. 
The oral testimony I gathered from elders emphasised the environmental and 
disease impacts25. Nearly 90 years after the second move, elders in western 
Narok (who have all died since being interviewed between 1997 and 2000) 
still talked with passion about its effects on the health of humans and herds. 
They described the impact of the move in ‘pathological’ terms, believing that 
the British deliberately sent them ‘to that land where ol-tikana is’ in order that 
they might die there26. They claimed that they and their herds succumbed to 
diseases in the Southern Reserve which were unknown or not prevalent in 
their northern territory, most specifically Laikipia, and that they had been 
blighted by sickness ever since. They insisted that the land they were moved 
to was not only grossly inferior to Entorror (the Maa word for the whole of 
their former northern territory) in terms of water supplies, grazing, and dis-
ease vectors, but that the new environment infected and killed them. In the 
collective oral mythology, Entorror was spoken about as an Eden, its sweet-
ness constantly compared to the bitterness (ol-odua, which also means 
rinderpest) of the Southern Reserve. 
 Sindiga has described how ‘colonial intervention in Maasailand led to the 
breakdown of traditional ecosystems’, and attributed the subsequent severe 
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degradation and pressures on land in Kajiado and Narok Districts to a process 
begun in 1904 (Sindiga 1984: 27). Tignor has written: ‘The loss of the dry 
weather grazing forced the Maasai to overwork the more arid southern re-
serve, resulting in loss of vegetation, soil erosion and overall decline in graz-
ing. In the twentieth century, the reserve became progressively less able to 
support its livestock’ (Tignor 1976: 8, 38). Rutten, in a study of factors that 
have led to land losses and undermined the livestock economy in Kajiado Dis-
trict, asserted: ‘Moreover, in terms of quality the loss (of alienated land before 
1912) was even more severe as green pastures located in ecologically favour-
able areas had to be abandoned and were replaced with a less comfortable 
habitat, heavily infested by tsetse fly and mostly lacking sufficient water and 
all year round grazing’ (Rutten 1992: 8). Western and Manzolillo Nightingale 
(2004) have linked the early land alienation and Kajiado pastoralists’ in-
creased vulnerability to drought. Other scholars have made similar remarks, 
briefly linking the early losses to later degradation, drought and other pres-
sures (for example, Campbell 1984; Thompson & Homewood 2002). I set out 
to explore the qualitative ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the land alienation in more 
depth, doing so in some trepidation, because I am not a scientist—‘only’ a so-
cial scientist turned historian. I therefore sought assistance from scientists at 
the International Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi, and veterinary experts 
(including retired veterinary officers who had worked in Kenya) who com-
mented on my drafts and provided invaluable information. Significantly, this 
broadly tended to support Maasai oral claims. None of these people could be 
described as blinkered fans of the Maasai or champions of indigenous rights; 
their corroboration was rooted in empirical science, not sentiment. Through 
triangulation, which included checking early veterinary records, I concluded 
that Maasai testimony on environmental issues was substantially reliable and 
the narratives largely consistent—except for a few wilder claims that there 
had been no diseases on Laikipia when the Maasai lived there27.  
 In theory, the area of land to which the Maasai were moved, the 4.4 mil-
lion-acre western extension added to the Southern Maasai Reserve in 1911, 
seems generous until one examines its quality. (The reserve as a whole was 
initially nearly 10 million acres, but one official admitted at the time ‘the ma-
jority of this is waterless’ ( McClure n.d.). However, it is not simply a matter 
of the quality of land. Such is their dependency on livestock, and total identi-
fication with cattle—en-kishu means both cattle and Maasai as a people—that 
cattle disease is inextricably linked to human health and is spoken of almost 
interchangeably with that of humans. (This dependency is lessening today as 
their economy diversifies to include agriculture and wildlife tourism. But 
Maasai elites and wealthy incomers dominate these sectors, leading to a grow-
ing gap between rich and poor. It is not simply a case of generalised ‘impov-
erishment’ resulting from relocation) (Thompson & Homewood 2002). 
Furthermore, I claimed, the grievances of these migrants should be understood 
in the context of acclimatisation over time and space. Other Maasai were al-
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ready living in this area when the ‘northerners’ arrived, so it could not be 
dismissed as an environment in which Maasai could not survive. The point 
was that the newcomers were unfamiliar with it, were non-resistant to certain 
infections, and in the interregnum between arrival and acclimatisation, when 
some resistance developed, both humans and stock suffered acutely. It was 
this suffering which coloured people’s memories of the move and what hap-
pened afterwards. 
 One could attempt to establish whether there is any scientific or bio-
medical basis for Maasai claims that the Northern Reserve was effectively 
free of the fatal cattle disease East Coast fever (ECF), and of a deliberate 
‘move to kill’ policy driven by administrators’ knowledge of the presence or 
absence of disease, particularly ECF, in the two environments. There is some 
compelling evidence to support the first of these claims, and some colonial of-
ficials certainly ‘subscribed to a Malthusian view of disease and drought as 
the natural regulators of the (African) stock population’ (Waller 2004: 46). 
But the search for scientific evidence is also an unsatisfactory exercise, in part 
because early scientific data simply does not exist, and because it involves 
comparing like with unlike: to put it crudely, a western scientific view of dis-
ease which is rooted in diagnostics and laboratory experiment, versus a more 
holistic indigenous view which regards ‘dis-ease’ as a natural part of life. 
Most importantly, I wrote, the subject is larger than scientific; it concerns dis-
ease as a metaphor for colonial encounters, and what these produced in social 
and other terms. In this case, I argued that ECF had come to represent — for 
the older generation of Purko Maasai at least — infection by colonialism, and 
it was their conceptualisation that interested me. Therefore I aimed to exam-
ine what scientific evidence there was in tandem with perceptions of disease 
and socio-environmental health, confining my focus largely to the Purko sec-
tion who bore the brunt of the second move, and to ECF.  
 The published work of government entomologist Aneurin Lewis in the 
1930s was a considerable aid; his detailed studies of ticks and tsetse in the 
Southern Reserve confirmed the enormity of the environmental challenges 
that faced the immigrants (Lewis 1934a, b). To summarise, I concluded the 
Southern Reserve was far inferior environmentally to Laikipia and Entorror as 
a whole; the incoming sections lost the wide range of habitat necessary for 
transhumant pastoralism; herders suffered an appalling lack of veterinary at-
tention, and experienced huge losses to diseases that their stock lacked resis-
tance to, during the move and in the decade following it. Much of this was 
documented in official records, notably George Sandford’s detailed adminis-
trative history of the Maasai (1919). But I also noted that ‘stories about dis-
ease (both stock and human) are partly a social metaphor, representing social 
fragmentation and Maasai loss of control over their physical environment, 
which were major end results of the moves and colonial intervention’ (Hughes 
2006: 172). 
 
/ Lotte Hughes 314 
A CRITICAL RESPONSE 
 
When I launched my book in Nairobi, critics took issue (among other things) 
with what it said about Maasai perceptions of the environmental attributes of 
Laikipia. One of the more considered responses came from a conservation bi-
ologist, who shall remain nameless. He sought to use ‘natural’ science to dis-
prove my research findings, implicitly questioning the veracity of Maasai oral 
history—in particular the picture my informants had painted of a territory that 
was environmentally superior to the one they were moved to. The exchange 
illustrated (albeit in a small and anecdotal way) the disjuncture between bio-
logical approaches and analyses and those that are historical. These and other 
disciplines should inform each other, I believe, in order to produce more nu-
anced analyses. To summarise his points, he could not understand why Maasai 
described Laikipia as so superior environmentally to the Southern Reserve 
(specifically what is now western Narok District). This was not in his view a 
result of climate. It partly depended on what area Laikipia was taken to en-
compass, but it lies in agro-climatological zone V (semi-arid), while western 
Narok is in zone IV (semi-humid to semi-arid) with a band of zone III (semi-
humid) around the Siria Escarpment. Large areas of the former Southern Re-
serve support agriculture, while most of Laikipia is marginal; his neighbours 
on Laikipia had just lost their second wheat harvest in a row. Rainfall on Lai-
kipia is more, not less, erratic than in western Narok, and water sources not as 
good as the Maasai claim. Many large ranches are now dependent on bore-
holes and dams. With regard to forests, he saw little difference in the avail-
ability of forests in the two areas (a reference to comparisons I had made). As 
for grazing, possibly that on Laikipia was much better in the early 1900s 
compared to the south today, and the Maasai were responsible for this 
(through burning of vegetation and relatively high stocking rates). Bush en-
croachment, or the reverse when elephant numbers rose, affected tsetse fly 
distribution. Today, the only really good cattle country on Laikipia is in the 
southern part; the north is only suitable for sheep. ECF is a major challenge 
for livestock farmers, probably exacerbated by the higher numbers of wildlife 
(compared to the 1900s) and ranchers’ reluctance to burn.  
 The story of Laikipia being a garden of Eden seemed very surprising to him 
in view of the outbreaks of smallpox, rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia in the 
1890s. He concluded: ‘It seems strange that Laikipia should have had such a 
strong role in people’s memory given that the Purko and Kisongo (sections) 
may not have been there for much more than 40 years in total. No question 
that malaria is much more of a problem in the south … Laikipia is high, dry 
and relatively cold, so not good mosquito country. Altogether it seems to me 
that the case for Laikipia being so much better environmentally than the 
Southern Reserve is not convincing, although it is likely that the move itself 
would have created problems for livestock, and the Maasai themselves have 
created good grazing’. 
Rough time in paradise / 315 
OTHER POINTS OF VIEW 
 
These remarks are ahistorical, since there have been huge environmental and 
technological changes in these two areas since the 1900s28. Overall, his per-
ceptions as a European conservation biologist must be set against Maasai per-
ceptions of environment; the two are fundamentally different. Moreover, 
transhumant pastoralists make use of environmental niches such as o-supuko 
(highland drought refuges), ol-purkel (lowland wet-season pasture) and wet-
lands in drylands (e.g. swamps). They move in and out of these niches accord-
ing to seasonal need. After they were confined to reserves, and forced to share 
space with other Maasai sections already living in the western part of the 
Southern Reserve, such seasonal migrations were severely curtailed, exacer-
bating their inability to cope with disease challenges. (In the old days people 
would simply move their herds away from tick- and tsetse-infested areas.) 
Maasai stock-keepers were subsequently condemned by European officials for 
‘over-stocking’ and ‘over-grazing’—yet these were a direct result of confine-
ment in reserves, and rising stock numbers due in part to belated improve-
ments in veterinary support. Aneurin Lewis pointed this out in 1934: 
 
As a result of British administration the Masai were confined to re-
serves and their migrations were much restricted. The infestation of 
large tracts of their country by tsetse flies, the lack of water in other 
areas of the reserve, still further prohibited such movements as oc-
curred prior to their limitation to reserves. Obviously this restriction 
prevented, to some extent, the old Masai custom of abandoning foul 
land and seeking clean pastures; it was accentuated when the stock in-
creased and created a congestion of the reserve29. 
 
The forests and streams my critic claimed were available to Maasai were ei-
ther off limits to residents of the reserve, and/or were controlled by European 
landowners (notably Lord Delamere and farmer Edward Powys Cobb on the 
Mau Escarpment). This is a good example of how biology and history can 
complement each other; if one is unaware of the fact that settlers controlled 
the headwaters of vital streams that rose on their land, one cannot argue that 
these migrants got a fair deal30.  
 I had also wondered during fieldwork why Purko Maasai should express 
such feelings of attachment to Laikipia when they had not lived there for very 
long. (The Kisongo section only came north to raid other Maasai sections.) 
But a lifetime is surely long enough, and on Laikipia the Purko (who bene-
fited in many ways from an early British-Maasai military alliance) were en-
joying a heyday (Waller 1976). Also, this brings us back to social memory: 
don’t people everywhere feel nostalgic, in the troublesome modern world, for 
a time and place when life seemed better and less complicated? Furthermore, 
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Purko leader Parsaloi Ole Gilisho—a folk hero who tried to oppose the move 
from Laikipia and initiated the 1913 lawsuit—was born Laikipiak (a member 
of the section that once dominated the Laikipia plateau). In remembering and 
eulogising Ole Gilisho today, people also eulogise the territory he attempted 
to regain. It is no surprise that it has acquired the status of a lost Eden in the 
collective memory. Laikipia has become a key site of memory, in part imag-
ined by modern day Maasai, many of whom have never been there—and who 
would not dream of giving up western Narok, and the Mara milk cow, in order 
to return north. Equally, for very different reasons, it represents a lost Eden in 
European settler thinking, epitomised by the writings of Italian set-
tler/conservationist Kuki Gallman (1991), which are infused with an imagined 
sense of entitlement to and identification with her adopted land31. 
 I invited private comments, from a colleague in Kenya, on the views ex-
pressed by the conservation biologist. She brought professional scientific in-
sights, as well as anthropological ones. She felt, generally speaking, that he 
was ‘missing the point’. For example: ‘Agro-ecological zones don’t mean 
anything to the Maasai, or any nomadic pastoralist. They move to get out of 
them, depending on whether it is the dry or wet season, or if there are 
droughts or not. Agro-ecological zones mean something if you are staying in 
one place, but they did not’. Production goals, and the kind of food people 
want for their cattle, should also be factored in. It made no sense, in her view, 
to compare the production goals of a modern wheat farmer with those of long-
ago pastoralists on Laikipia. The latter had more sense than to grow crops 
there; it was brilliant cattle country, as was the central Rift Valley around Na-
ivasha, but it was not the right place for wheat. As for rainfall, ‘the Maasai 
don’t care about erratic rainfall. Their entire production system is based on 
coping with that. As long as they can go where it does rain, it doesn’t matter 
at all’. Maasai cattle (indigenous humped Bos indicus) cannot be compared 
with European breeds (Bos taurus); they can tolerate much greater variation in 
food and conditions, and are much less susceptible than European breeds to 
diseases such as trypanosomiasis32. Also Maasai will vary their herd composi-
tion, and acquire more small stock (sheep and goats) when necessary. This al-
lows them to take advantage of environmental and forage conditions; shoats’ 
disease and drought tolerance are also important factors33.  
 Another Kenyan commented: ‘As usual with Kenya, people’s investments 
and motivations lie too close to the surface for them not to be seen and ques-
tioned. It is interesting that (the conservation biologist) chooses not to con-
front, with all his knowledge of place, the reasons why (white) settlers were 
so intent on moving there’. It was heavily promoted as a fecund and healthy 
place for European settlement ever since Scottish explorer Joseph Thomson 
and British administrator Sir Harry Johnston (among others) visited the pla-
teau in the late nineteenth century (Thomson 1885). 
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BACK TO THE ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
 
Perceptions, both scholarly and non-scholarly, are obviously shaped by socio-
political situations—in this case, the charged issue of who has the right to 
own and control land and resources in Kenya’s former ‘white highlands’. My 
critic was basically saying: ‘African oral evidence is flawed; romanticised 
claims conceal a biological reality’. However, he was assessing this relocation 
from the standpoint of one of scores of European ranchers who over time 
moved into the area vacated by the Maasai. Equally, I suggest social scientists 
and historians should guard against seeing ‘conservation processes’ (dis-
placement from parks) purely in terms of ‘equity and justice’ for the dispos-
sessed and vanquished (Rangarajan & Shahabuddin 2006: 360). We need to 
disaggregate historical/geographical/anthropological arguments from repara-
tions discourses; it is all too easy to be seduced by the latter, and claims are 
often more complex than they appear at first sight. These authors acknowl-
edge this elsewhere (Rangarajan 2005; Shahabuddin et al. 2007), conceding 
that relocation from protected areas is sometimes necessary in exceptional 
circumstances, so long as it is carried out equitably, transparently, and in a 
participatory manner. 
 It goes without saying that communities are not homogeneous entities that 
speak with one voice or represent everyone. Also, although there are strong 
historical arguments to support a restitution claim in the Maasai case, it is 
ironic that activists are using a British construction, ‘Maasailand’ (as it ap-
peared on early maps of the region), to pursue their demands for the return of 
territory. In fact, Maasai did not customarily own land before the British (and 
post-independence governments) introduced individualised tenure, and the 
‘Kenyan’ part of this territory (which stretched south into Tangany-
ika/Tanzania) was historically shared with other peoples including Kikuyu, 
Ogiek, Mukogodo, Yaaku, Il Chamus, Nandi and Tugen, as is evident from 
numerous descriptions of nineteenth-century trade, peace agreements, inter-
marriage, cultural borrowing and other practices34. But of course, it does not 
fit contemporary claims rhetoric to say: ‘We want the land back, and our old 
neighbours and in-laws should have a slice, too’. 
 Insistence on bounded, ethnic distinctiveness is itself a colonial legacy of 
the concretisation of ‘tribe’ (see for example Lynch 2007). I have pointed out 
elsewhere (Hughes 2005) that contemporary Maasai obsession with bounda-
ries and the expressed need to repel ‘aliens’ or ‘immigrants’ (that is, Kikuyu 
and Kipsigis people) from western Narok (this is what politicians really mean 
when they talk of population pressure and land rights) is a direct result of 
British reservation policies (also see Waller 1993; Waller & Sobania 1994; 
Igoe 2004: 9–10). As I write, more news is breaking of violence between dif-
ferent groups in Trans-Mara. Up the road in Narok town, William Ole Nti-
mama (MP for Narok North) is denouncing ‘importation of voters’ as 
‘electoral fraud’, demanding that the Electoral Commission of Kenya ‘inves-
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tigate why in some areas there have been large numbers of immigrants regis-
tered as voters … My constituency is not a dumping site where every Tom, 
Dick and Harry has a say on who should lead. It cannot happen under my 
watch’. He is quoted as saying he wants to bar ‘immigrants’ from voting or 
standing for election in Narok District35. All this (and a lot more besides, if 
one had the space to discuss it) suggests that the big story in Kenya today is 
not primarily displacement for conservation, driven by western ‘neo-liberal’ 
agendas, but displacement by Africans of other Africans in order to grab 
dwindling resources, make money from land speculation, and consolidate 
votes and power bases ahead of general elections in December 2007. Can we 
broaden the discussion, please? We should not be fooled by the environmen-
talist spin put on some of these displacements, e.g. from the Mau Forests, 
about which Ntimama has also been vocal36. (This article was written long be-
fore the results of the election were known and contested, triggering conflict. 
This is politically inspired, but with unfortunate undertones of the inter-ethnic 
rivalries mentioned here). 
 Elsewhere Carruthers, writing comparatively about national parks in South 
Africa and Australia, has noted that they ‘are currently favoured spaces for re-
claiming, perhaps even reinventing, the cultures of formerly disadvantaged 
peoples’ (my emphasis). She warns of the dangers of communities using parks 
to ‘spearhead campaigns for native title’ and as shrines to ethnic nationalism 
(Carruthers 2003: 255, 265). As mentioned, Brockington highlights how ‘hu-
man rights attention to land loss at Mkomazi now focuses on Maasai pastoral-
ists to the exclusion of other groups’ who lost just as much, if not more. A 
‘multi-ethnic account’ of the shared occupancy of Mkomazi has given way to 
a Maasai hegemonic one. He cites Igoe, who ‘found that, in Simanjiro, atten-
tion to the plight of “marginalised Maasai” acts to the detriment of the poor 
within multi-ethnic communities, with Maasai elites using donor support to 
expropriate resources from more marginal, non-Maasai villagers’ (Brocking-
ton 2002: 115). Ole Kimpei and Galaty have rightly pointed a finger at cor-
ruption and hypocrisy in the Kenyan Maasai leadership, at the local and 
national level, which ‘is seriously compromised by its conflict of interest over 
the land question since it is most likely to benefit from land alienation and 
sale’ (Kimpei & Galaty 1999: 70). In this scenario, there is no simple binary 
opposition between western capitalism and African peasantry; some ‘peas-
ants’ have become capitalists, who fleece their brethren37. 
 
MASAI MARA: LOSS OR GAIN? 
 
Mara is a good example of the need to look beyond claims rhetoric to the his-
torical facts. In contrast to Laikipia, fount and focus of rich social memory, 
memories of Mara do not appear to feature in the collective meta-narrative—
but it is beginning to inspire manufactured claims, which are something else 
altogether. I have not found any evidence that more than a few Maasai were 
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moved from this 1510 km2 area to make way for the Masai Mara Game Re-
serve. (More research would be required to establish this; I make no pretence 
of having done more than a cursory desk study.) My local informants say no 
one lived in this area all year round, because of tsetse and ticks. About thirty 
families used it seasonally for 2–3 months each year, and then withdrew. 
When the reserve was created they moved a short distance away, and now live 
on the neighbouring Koiyaki-Lemek group ranches38. But one would not 
know this from the numerous public statements and debates on historical and 
contemporary injustices in Kenyan Maasailand, many of them online. Maasai 
anthropologist Naomi Kipury (n.d.) refers correctly to the alienation of ‘the 
best Maasai grazing areas by the colonial government and a continuation of 
the same policy by subsequent administration’, but includes Mara among ‘the 
better endowed pastoral grazing areas;’ this was true of the central Rift, but 
not Mara39. Mukhisa Kituyi states that the creation of Mara deprived ‘pastor-
alists of some of their most important land’40. Meitemei Olol-Dapash, a self-
appointed Maasai ‘cultural ambassador’ living in the US, told an interviewer 
from the indigenous rights organisation Cultural Survival: ‘Before (Mara) was 
a national park (sic), this area was very important for grazing’41. The same 
source, a curriculum which used information from US-based Maasai contacts, 
states as fact: ‘The Maasai have been excluded from their best traditional 
grazing lands, which are now the Masai Mara National Reserve, Amboseli 
National Park, and various protected forests’42. This does not say exclusion 
from Mara was by force, but it implies as much, and fails to mention Maasai 
control of the reserves via the county councils, or the massive tourism reve-
nues accruing to these Maasai-controlled bodies43.  
 The area that became a reserve (Mara is loosely used to describe a much 
larger zone around the Mara River) has long been known as tsetse infested. 
Stock-keepers avoided it. Tsetse spread steadily north-east from 1900; before 
then, its presence does not appear to have interfered with human occupation 
of the area. Various reports between 1908 and 1914, commissioned by British 
administrators, indicated heavy infestation along the Lower Mara and its 
tributaries. By the early 1930s, tsetse had forced Maasai to abandon ‘most of 
the best-watered grazing areas’ in western Narok (Waller 1990: 88, citing 
Lewis 1934b). Lewis described how ‘the whole region of Osero (between the 
Loita plains and the Tanganyika border) is uninhabited, for one reason, be-
cause of its infestation with the tsetse flies Glossina synnertoni and Glossina 
pallidipes’, repeating a few pages later: ‘The Osero country stretching from 
the Mara River … to the Tanganyika border is totally devoid of stock and of 
native villages’ (Lewis 1934a: 7, 24; my emphasis). This is unequivocal eye 
witness evidence. ‘By 1940, tsetse fly had made some 900 square miles (c. 
2300 km2) of grazing land unusable—in effect creating the Masai Mara Na-
tional Reserve’45. We cannot be certain about earlier population figures, but a 
useful pointer is Sandford’s map of trade centres in the Southern Reserve up 
to 1918. There are only two marked near what is now the Game Reserve, but 
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outside its boundary, at Angata Pusi (east bank of the Lower Mara River), and 
Sianna (now spelled Siana, about 12 km north-east of the reserve boundary). 
None are marked in the area later alienated for conservation. This compares to 
clusters in environmentally superior areas, e.g. around the Loita Hills and 
plains, and at Mara Bridge, which suggests higher population (Sandford 1919: 
95–98, and map facing 98).  
 Ntimama, a leading champion of Maasai ethnic nationalism in Kenya, is 
fond of making sweeping statements that ignite his constituents’ imaginations 
while obscuring the facts. ‘Look at the Mara’, he told a meeting in Nairobi in 
early 2006 to discuss the Maasai land claim. ‘Most of the parks in this country 
have been carved out of the Maa community land unit: Mara, Tarangire, Am-
boseli, Manyara, Serengeti … these areas are all denied to the Maasai for 
grazing’46. (Tarangire, Manyara and Serengeti are all in Tanzania.) He did not 
mention his lucrative stake in the two Governors tourist camps in Mara, on 
land he reportedly owns. Force was certainly used to expel people from Ser-
engeti, Ngorongoro, Mkomazi and other Tanzanian protected areas for con-
servation. But with Mara, as mentioned above, local oral testimony reveals a 
different story. Maasai living near the reserve have previously told other re-
searchers: ‘We donated this place to the government for the animals’47. Fur-
thermore, recent press coverage of Ntimama’s opposition to a constituency 
sub-division (which will force arch rivals to share revenue from Mara) quoted 
councillors in Narok North who ‘pointed out that the reserve was set aside by 
Purko Maasai clan elders for the benefit of the community’48.  
 Frans Mol, who lived for years at the mission in nearby Lemek, and gath-
ered oral testimony in the Mara area, described how the game reserve came 
about:  
 
To come to some tighter control of the area (to prevent poaching and 
‘encroachment’ by domestic livestock) the Mara National Reserve was 
officially gazetted in November 1948. It comprised the area generally 
known as the Mara Triangle … In 1957 stricter laws controlling the 
shooting of animals were introduced. The Mara National Reserve was 
abolished in 1961. The then Kenya Government showed faith in the 
Maasai park proposal by offering the Maasai an annual subsidy in re-
turn for retaining the status quo in the Mara, a region, which owing to 
the prevalence of tsetse fly, the Maasai could not use for their cattle. 
It was the intention that the park or game reserve should be Maasai-
owned. The idea was for African participation and to serve tribal inter-
ests by conserving wild life for the material improvement of the Maasai 
(Mol 1980: 49; my emphasis). 
 
This again suggests that few Maasai were living there. Waller confirms this 
hypothesis: ‘I would certainly agree that parks didn’t always cause massive 
displacement—and I would say that Mara was a case in point’. To his knowl-
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edge, there were no very important natural resources within the game reserve 
boundaries to which herders no longer had access once it was gazetted. Tsetse 
fly would have made the grazing unattractive, though it is difficult to assess 
and periodise how much fly was present along the banks of the Mara. ‘The 
only (Maasai) group with a long-term stake in the area of the reserve itself 
were probably Laitayiok—but they were out of the picture before 1900’49. In 
the 1890s, when rinderpest, bovine pleuro-pneumonia, smallpox and famine 
swept through East Africa, large parts of Maasailand were temporarily aban-
doned. At the turn of the century the numbers of people remaining here would 
have been negligible. By 1902, ‘most of the western plains were now empty 
and the Anglo-German Boundary Commission of 1904 found even the area 
immediately south of the Loita Hills depopulated by war and disease’. This 
led to bush encroachment, and with it more tsetse (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 
20–28). Archaeologists could probably produce definitive evidence of past 
settlement, or its absence. 
 Today the Masai Mara Game Reserve is controlled by the Maasai-
dominated Narok County Council, not the central government, while the ad-
joining protected area of Trans-Mara is run jointly by a private conservancy 
and Maasai council50. Revenues from wildlife tourism go to these bodies; for 
Narok, they were reportedly more than one million Kenya shillings a day in 
the high season (£7,581, Rs. 6,15,374), before the latest tourism boom. Kenya 
made $750 million from Mara in 200651. But this success story does not fit 
with revisionist and restorationist rhetoric—Mara was among the areas lost, 
people were forcibly displaced, therefore paradise must be regained. Activists 
are now planning a claim to Mara; the grounds are unspecified, though earlier 
planning documents state that claims against the Kenyan government for 
greater benefit sharing from protected areas are ‘grounded on the fact that the 
conversion of parts of (Maasai) land into protected areas was never discussed 
with the community’52. Fair enough; like the Maasai ‘Agreements’ and myr-
iad other pacts between the powerful and the powerless, the degree of in-
formed consent in this case is highly questionable. As for the broader 
narrative, McGregor notes in relation to Zimbabwe that they are at one level 
‘a means by which marginalised minorities have tried to redefine who they are 
and create a place for themselves—both physical and cultural—within a na-
tion from which they feel politically and economically excluded’ (2003: 105). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
‘Masai rights are a very real thing’, wrote British colonial administrator 
Charles Hobley in 190453. (He was referring to their rights to the central Rift 
Valley, which his government grabbed soon afterwards.) Maasai land losses 
are very real, too, as are their socio-economic, environmental and political re-
percussions. On a psychological level, the long-term impacts have also been 
severe, as they are for any minority or indigenous community that has experi-
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enced historical injustices; one cannot underestimate this bruising postcolo-
nial legacy. 
 But we should also beware of the role played by both settler and indigenous 
African imaginings of landscape and loss. We cannot assume all displacement 
from protected areas was coerced, just because politicians and pundits say so, 
or that forced removals took place at all in order to create certain parks. What 
scholars of social memory (especially in post-conflict situations) call ‘pur-
poseful forgetting’ may be a factor on both sides of the fence—settler and in-
digene. It contributes to a master narrative of dislocation and loss, especially 
strong in post-apartheid South Africa where it was institutionalised through 
Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) processes, and informed that country’s resti-
tution project. But some now regard this as too simple a script, whose useful-
ness has waned. ‘As political fable the master narrative works very well, but 
as a basis for a programme of government the simple story of forced removals 
is increasingly problematic’. Walker describes how ‘the simple story of resti-
tution is a founding myth in our new democracy’—but isn’t much help when 
it comes to resolving complex claims and determining the future (Walker 
2000: 7, 14). 
 Kenya lacks TRC and restitution processes, and does not even have a land 
policy. But there are parallels with, and lessons to be learned from, South Af-
rica. The very notion of territorial homelands to which people are urged to re-
turn is feeding constructions of identity, exclusivity, history, heritage and 
ethnic essentialism, which in turn shape land claims and the discourses around 
them, and manifest in racism and xenophobia. This is very evident in western 
Narok, in attitudes routinely displayed towards non-Maasai, which are them-
selves partly a product of British reservation policy and promises to Maasai 
that ‘aliens’ would be excluded from their reserve. Such constructions also 
produce ‘virtualisms’, every bit as powerful and alarming as conservationist 
virtualisms, and equally ripe for unpicking54. In the Mara case, revisionist his-
tories are not erasing people from pristine environments (as the worst kind of 
conservationists are accused of doing), but conversely seek to re-insert people 
into places where they never lived55.  
 Shirley Brooks, writing about game reserves in South Africa, has noted ‘the 
peculiar ease with which it is possible to conceive of natural spaces as exist-
ing outside of history, or alternatively as carriers of a romanticised history’. 
Hopefully, we can all agree on this. I endorse her plea to place these spaces 
‘back in history … located in their political and historical context’, as part of 
an inter-disciplinary approach to the thorough data collection exercise which 
Brockington and Igoe (2006) call for (Brooks 2000: 63–64). 
 
Notes 
 
 1. The first part of this title is lifted with thanks from Parselelo Kantai (pers. comm.). It was 
his response to remarks by European ranchers that imply Laikipia is an environmentally 
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poor place to live. Equally, it could also be applied to Maasai elites who cynically complain 
about the supposed loss of the Masai Mara, while simultaneously capitalising on wildlife 
tourism there. Maasai is the correct spelling for the community, speakers of the Maa lan-
guage, but Masai will be used when citing colonial records, and also when referring to the 
Masai Mara Game Reserve. 
 2. British East Africa became Kenya colony in 1920 Hughes (2002, 2006). 
 3. Before the advent of parks, a Northern and a Southern Game Reserve were created in Brit-
ish East Africa between 1899 and 1900; the Southern one was re-gazetted in 1906. They 
partially overlapped with the Maasai Reserves (first established in 1904), since British ad-
ministrators regarded the community as co-existing happily with wildlife. Maasai do not, 
generally speaking, eat or hunt game. Exceptions include famine situations, the killing of 
predators that threaten livestock, and periodic protest killings in or near parks, in order to 
make a political statement about exclusion and related issues. 
 4. Equally, I take issue with Brockington and Igoe’s emphasis on the need for more anthro-
pology in order to increase our knowledge of displacement (article under review). Granted, 
this is aimed at an anthropological readership, but let us hear it for history and related dis-
ciplines, too. 
 5. Campbell (1984: 40-41), I briefly discuss the history of Amboseli in Beinart and Hughes 
(2007, Ch. 16). National parks fall under the remit of the governmental Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS), while reserves are the responsibility of county councils. 
 6. KWS mentions the latter on its website, www.kws.org; follow links to Tsavo. Kenya’s 
largest park, Tsavo was divided into West and East for ease of administration. See Steinhart 
(2006, particularly Chapter 10), for a description of Waata and Kamba hunting in Tsavo. 
About 2000 Waata lived on the eastern margins of the original park, while Kitui Akamba 
people inhabited the western and northern portions of Tsavo East, no population numbers 
given (n21, 194). For other writers, see for example Kituyi (1998) who states Tsavo was 
‘established on … Maasai land’ (1998: 31). Brockington discusses parallels at Mkomazi, 
where a colonial administrative focus on Maa-speakers—which ignored the presence of Kamba, 
Sambaa and Pare pastoralists—has similarly ‘coloured developments ever since’ (2002: 37). 
 7. Publications include Western (1982, 1994). Brockington claims (2002: 139-140) that ‘de-
tailed political accounts’ have been written about Maasai eviction from Amboseli, citing 
Lindsay (1987) and Western (1994). With respect, these accounts are not the equivalent of 
deep historical/ethnographic field studies detailing people’s experiences over time and 
space, which would require gathering substantial oral testimony. Neither author claims to 
have carried out detailed research on this specific subject. 
 8. Brockington and Igoe (forthcoming) note the absence of good data on evictions generally—
‘there are few studies of actual physical displacement and exclusion … and fewer still of 
the accounts of physical exclusion are based on good scholarship’. Although the following 
study will not directly remedy this lack, anthropologist David Turton (2002) is embarking 
(with others at the University of Oxford) on a major research project that will provide rare 
historical evidence on the history of the Omo National Park, Ethiopia, one of the most bio-
logically and culturally diverse areas in Africa. This will include examining the impact of 
human use and occupation, but it will not primarily be a study of the impact of protected 
area policy on local people. My thanks to David Turton for sharing this information. 
 9. Lonsdale warns: ‘The tension between history … and narrative memories of what might 
have been is particularly acute in the case of Kenya’ (2003: 46). 
10. The danger is that this inference is then picked up by popular writers, media, scholars, 
NGOs et al., and disseminated more widely without being challenged or scrutinised. Myth 
replicates rapidly on the internet, where it is often presented as fact. 
11. I have not checked the entire book, but memory and remembering is not listed in the index 
or adequately discussed as a subject category in the obvious places, e.g. Chapters 3 and 5, 
Histories, People. 
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12. Forced removals that took place in South Africa under apartheid laws are a different matter. 
Fabricius and De Wet suggest these had more to do with administration and control of rural 
areas than conservation concerns (2002: 145). 
13. The diseases trypanosomiasis and human sleeping sickness are caused by protozoan para-
sites, trypansomes, transmitted by tsetse flies (Glossina spp.) Trypanosomiasis affects cat-
tle, sheep, goats, many game animals and camels. 
14. Maasai NGOs and activists display an ambivalence about this marketability, protesting 
about outsider exploitation of Maasai culture and identity while simultaneously capitalising 
upon it (pers. comms. and observations). 
15. Settlements to which tourists are bussed in from local lodges, for a fee, to see traditional 
dancing and buy curios. The word manyata means a warrior encampment, but it is often 
used incorrectly to refer to Maasai villages or homesteads. 
16. The late ‘Paramount Chief’ Lerionka Ole Ntutu of Olchororua, western Narok, was among 
my doctoral informants, and I lodged with a daughter in Lemek during fieldwork in 
1999-2000. He and his family enjoyed considerable political patronage under successive 
regimes, and the then president Daniel arap Moi attended his funeral at Olchororua, Mara, 
in April 2000. His son Stephen Ole Ntutu is at the time of writing MP for Narok South; 
deeply unpopular, he is expected to lose his seat in the December 2007 elections. 
17. Emerton 2001, Box 14.2 on Mara: ‘Distribution of wildlife tourism revenues to communi-
ties in Kenya’: 212. The UN’s Special Rapporteur states 19 per cent of the revenue from 
Mara ‘is said to be invested in favour of local Maasai communities’, but local people told 
him they did not see the benefits (Stavenhagen 2007: 15). More than 70 per cent of Kenyan 
wildlife is reportedly to be found outside protected areas (Chiemelu 2003, and others). 
18. Thompson and Homewood (2002: 124–125) note the increasing importance of tourism to 
group ranches adjacent to the Mara, not simply revenue deriving from enterprises inside the 
reserve. My community contacts there only express a desire to control, via Community 
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), wildlife and wildlife tourism in these 
group ranch lands, and to receive their fair share of revenue from the reserve and game 
viewing in the dispersal area. Apart from periodic attempts by some local people during se-
vere drought to take domestic stock into the reserve, e.g. in 2006 when offenders were 
fined and jailed, by predominantly Maasai authorities, I have not heard anyone at this level 
(as opposed to political/activist circles) say that they want to live in the reserve, or lament 
the loss of its resources. As for size: Masai Mara is 1510 km2; Amboseli 392 km2; Hell’s 
Gate NP 68.25 km2; Nairobi NP 117 km2; Nakuru NP 188 km2, but Tsavo West 7065 km2. 
Source for all but Mara: www.kws.org. Norton-Griffiths 1995 discusses the Mara area and 
surrounding 4566 km2 group ranches (this was their size in 1989). 
19. For information on evictions of people from the Mau Forests, ostensibly for environmental 
protection, see Amnesty International Briefing Paper (2007). For Mount Elgon, where 
116,200 people had been displaced by 2 August 2007, see reports by the Red Cross and In-
tegrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) at www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb, 
www.irinnews.org; also the Kenyan press, e.g., www.eastandard.net. Lynch (2007: 55-57) 
gives some background to this conflict. 
20. The Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania are divided into socio-territorial sections called il-
oshon. The Purko—who bore the brunt of the second forced move (1911-1913)—is one of 
the largest. 
21. Estimates from Sandford. He does not give a definitive total. Other sources on European 
settlement, the Maasai moves and opposition to them include Leys (1924), McGregor Ross 
(1927), Cashmore (1965), Mungeam (1966), Sorrenson (1968), Tignor (1976) and Wylie 
(1997). 
22. Others have tried to quantify the size of pre-colonial Maasailand. Rutten gives a useful list 
of estimates culled from other sources (1992: 7, n8). He gives the total area of the two 
Maasai Reserves as about 24,000 km2 compared to a pre-colonial Kenya Maasai territory of 
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55,000 km2—‘a reduction of almost 60 per cent’, 177. But both reserves had areas added 
and excised over time. 
23. Olol-Dapash (2001) claims ‘an estimated six million hectares’ was alienated, but does not 
substantiate this. The figure comes across as a wild guess. 
24. This section is lifted from Chapter 5 of my book (2006), with some updating. 
25. These testimonies have been deposited on CD in the public library at National Museums of 
Kenya, Nairobi. They may also be deposited at the British Empire and Commonwealth Mu-
seum, Bristol. 
26. This Maa word means both human malaria and East Coast fever (ECF) in cows. ECF is a 
disease of cattle caused by the protozoan parasite Theileria parva, carried by the brown ear 
tick Rhipicephalus appendiculatus. 
27. Most elders were interviewed individually, often many miles apart, and (outside my imme-
diate fieldwork area of Lemek/Mara) were often visited ‘cold’, which reduced the likeli-
hood of informants producing prepared, collectivised testimony. Details of informants in 
Appendix I, Hughes (2006). 
28. Waller concurs with this assessment and much of what follows; in his view the biologist’s 
remarks are ‘completely ahistorical’ (pers. comm.). My thanks go to him for commenting 
on the article as a whole. 
29. Lewis (1934a: 53). 
30. Waller disagrees with me on this point, saying Cobb did not interfere with streams in this 
area (pers. comm.). However, I am inclined to believe Leys was right to question these set-
tlers’ control of the headwaters (1925 edition: 107). 
31. Also see her website www.gallmankenya.org. 
32. My thanks to veterinary expert Dr Glyn Davies for clarification. 
33. My thanks to Deborah Manzolillo Nightingale for making these points. For an example of 
disease tolerance, shoats survive better than cattle under medium tsetse challenge (Griffin 
& Allonby 1979), and can therefore graze areas that are unsuitable for cattle. 
34. Galaty (1993) describes the history and current reality of ‘ethnic shifting’ in Maasailand, 
Waller and Sobania (1994) the complexity of social interactions over time. 
35. Kipchumba Kemei, ‘MP warns over importation of voters’, The Standard, Nairobi, 7 July 
2007. 
36. Kenyan journalists Parselelo Kantai and Billy Kahora have recently investigated the multi-
ple contestations in and around the Mau Forests which involve Maasai, Ogiek and other 
communities. A book is forthcoming. 
37. Igoe refers to ‘strategies of extraversion’, 2004: 10-11. Spear (1993: 14) notes the trend 
towards private accumulation by politicians who simultaneously proclaim their support for 
‘traditional’ communalist values. 
38. Personal communication with contacts. The families include those of Ole Nampaso, Ole 
Muli, Ole Kipetu, Ole Naurori, Ole Tompoi, Ole Sengeny and Ole Tinka. They reportedly 
moved voluntarily to the dispersal area from Musiara, an area on the Lower Mara River 
which means tsetse fly in Maa (not found in Mol (1996), who gives ol-torroboni, pl. il-
torobo: 393). My contacts say the species found there is most dangerous for humans, not 
stock, which indicates the presence of T. brucei rhodesiense or T. b. gambiense, the proto-
zoan parasites that cause human sleeping sickness. Local Maasai use the word musiara in a 
curse: ‘May you be killed by tsetse’ (Mikitang’oro musiara). 
39. Article viewed online at www.whoseland.com. 
40. He rolls Mara together with the Samburu and Marsabit ‘game sanctuaries;’ the statement 
may well be true of the latter, but not, I suggest, of Mara. Kituyi (1998: 31). 
41. Interview by Megan Epter Wood for Cultural Survival Curriculum Resource (2003): 39; 
seen online. This came from a longer article in Issue 23.2 of Cultural Survival Quarterly, 
31 July 1999. Olol-Dapash is described as executive director of the NGO Maasai Environ-
mental Resource Coalition (MERC). 
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42. Interview by Megan Epter Wood for Cultural Survival Curriculum Resource (2003): 13. 
Ledama Olekina, a Kenyan Maasai now living in the USA, who was previously closely associ-
ated with Cultural Survival, was one source of information. My thanks to Lisa Matthews of 
Cultural Survival, who coordinated the research on which this was based, for clarification. 
43. In a recent report on Kenya, the UN’s Special Rapporteur states (quoting p. 81 of the 2004 
Ndungu Report, commissioned by the Kenya government to investigate illegal public land 
transactions): ‘Most of the abuses after independence took place in Trust Lands, including 
former native reserves. The Constitution vests the administration of these lands in the 
County Councils, which acted “in total breach of trust as custodians of land on behalf of lo-
cal residents” through the irregular adjudication of vast areas in favour of powerful indi-
viduals and settlers from other communities, and the establishment of protected areas’ 
Stavenhagen (2007: 10). 
44. Species found in the area where the Game Reserve now lies were largely G. swynnertoni 
and pallipedes. He, and the earlier report writers, relied heavily on Maasai informants. In 
the 1930s, these game-rich areas of Osero and the ‘Mara valley’ were already popular with 
foreign hunting parties, who provided ‘a useful source of revenue’: 448. 
45. This is not the current size of the Mara reserve, Lamprey and Waller (1990: 25) (n18). The 
historical incidence of tsetse in western Narok is described in Waller (1990), who maps its 
progression from 1914-1946: 86. This work, drawing on Lewis, clearly shows tsetse belts 
in the area that is now reserved. 
46. Meeting attended by the author. 
47. Oral testimony gathered by Parselelo Kantai during research in western Narok in 2006. My 
thanks to him for permission to quote. 
48. Kipchumba Kemei, ‘Row over Masai Mara after creation of new district’, The Standard, 
Nairobi, 24 February 2007. 
49. Personal communication. Many thanks to Richard Waller for sharing these insights. For 
Laitayiok Maasai historical patterns of occupation and movement, see Waller (1990) and 
Lamprey and Waller (1990: 20, 22, 23). 
50. Kantai (2003) investigated alleged malpractice within this conservancy. 
51. Karl Lyimo, ‘Serengeti projects will kill off the golden goose’, The East African, July 30-5 
August 2007, p. 13. 
52. ‘Towards the Effective Redress’ (2004: 6). Other information from personal communica-
tions with activists. 
53. Hobley to Lord Lansdowne (Secretary of State for the Colonies), 13 July 1904, FO2/838, 
National Archives, London. 
54. Brockington and Igoe (forthcoming). The term virtualisms is taken from Carrier and Miller 
(1998). ‘Virtualisms imagine an appearance or order to the world, and then transform real-
ity to match their image’, Brockington and Igoe (op cit., p. 3) of earlier undated draft. 
55. At least, by all accounts they never lived there all year round. The reference to erasure is 
from West and Carrier (2004), cited in Brockington and Igoe (op cit). 
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